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In no other living species does technology (or more precisely the need for technological
development) play such an important role as it does in the human species. This rationale
remains surely a matter of fact regarding the “traditional” or “common” condition of the
man, understood as a being living “on the Earth” and with a specific and consolidated
biological structure. However, any possible understanding of the same issue requires
new efforts if and as far we try to maintain it open in a totally different context: “the
space,” namely, a not-specific place outside Earth in which the man is trying to give
shape to a new path of its own surviving (§ 1). Here rises what we would like to call
the “anthropology of limit.” In order to grasp a provisional content for such expression,
we must proceed analytically, first, by reconsidering briefly the two conceptual sides
implied in that expression, namely “What is a man?” and “What do we mean with limit?”
(§ 2). Secondly, we should try to reconsider the twofold results under a synthetical
or comprehensive point of view, trying to gather a common area of questioning that
opens up if and as far we reconsider both conceptual sides of that expression within the
“space-context” (§ 3).
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INTRODUCTION
The human being is continually forced by his own nature to project himself beyond his limits. The
debate on human nature—that is why man is the way he is, how he has been able to evolve, and
who he can become in the near or more distant future—produces a stable set of questions that is
constantly being posed anew, but to which the answers can never be exhausted. This is perhaps the
outcome of an intrinsic specificity of human beings. As has been perceptively pointed out, in no
other living species does technology (or more precisely the need for technological development)
play as important a role as it does in the human species (Gerhardt, 2008). Almost every animal
species is able to implement “techniques” in order to improve its living conditions, that is to
produce tools or structures capable of enhancing its ability to procure food and defend itself. No
animal, however, is as dependent on the constant renewal of its own capacities and their outcomes
as the human being. This is also a fundamentally two-sided quality, rooted in two (opposing)
emotional states: fear of inadequacy, on the one hand, anxiety for perfection, on the other.
As long as we refer to man in his natural state or “conventional” condition, namely as an
earthly being with a specific biological structure, this peculiarity of the human being is a matter
beyond dispute: to assert it is to make a factual statement. It immediately becomes a matter open
to contestation, however, when we try to extend it to a new and very different context: space or the
Universe, an unspecified expanse outside Earth where man is trying to carve out a new path for his
own survival.
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This is where what we would like to call the anthropology of
limit comes into play. To gain a preliminary understanding of
what this expression means, we must proceed “analytically.” The
first step is to briefly remind ourselves of the two conceptual
questions implied in the expression: “what is a human being?”
and “what do we mean by limit?” (§ 2). The next step is
to reconsider these questions and the answers to them in a
comprehensive or synthetic manner. We must try to establish a
basis for further developing and turning these questions as we
venture into the new cosmic context (§ 3).
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LIMIT—I:
ABOUT THE MEANING OF “HUMAN
BEING” AND OF “LIMIT”
Any serious attempt, however minimalistic, at formulating an
answer to the question: what is a human being? would inevitably
have to grapple with the questions at hand. To aid us in this quest,
I would like to point out three fundamental features (and the
nuances they entail) that have played a significant role in shaping
the modern imaginary and mankind’s own idea of what its role
on Earth ought to be.
Three Features (and Their Corresponding
Nuances) of the Human Being as an Idea
The first feature can be formulated based on an assumption
made by Francis Bacon (1561–1626) at the very dawn of Western
modernity: the human being was created to become “the master
of the Earth.”1
This assumption is premised on two essential characteristics.
The first of these is the peculiar relationship between Christianity
and Humanism, specifically the awareness that human beings
have been given a task by God. As long as he cannot access the
heavenly delights that await him after life on Earth,man is obliged
to improve his living conditions on Earth, using his rationality
and inventiveness to enhance his own capacities. These two
virtues of rationality and inventiveness—and here we come to the
second Humanistic premise of that assumption—strive for the
most extensive control of the world possible, a mastery of natural
resources and of men2.
The two remaining features of the human idea would first
manifest themselves in the work of Plessner and Gehlen, the
originators of philosophical anthropology as an autonomous
discipline.
Helmuth Plessner (1892–1985) paradigmatically defined the
human being as an “eccentric being” (Plessner, 2003). While
animals are “centered,” being capable of a determined number of
tasks that may vary in number from species to species, but will
always remain “focused,” defined and aprioristically predictable,
man is simultaneously rooted in a context and located outside it,
constitutively open to the broader world.
1The paradigmatic reference comes from his magnum opus, Novum Organon
[1620]. For a classic English edition of this work see Bacon (1855). Bacon’s work is
now easily available in Bacon (2000).
2It is with this insight that Bacon’s work establishes itself at the very core of modern
concepts of “power.”
Following Arnold Gehlen (1904–1976), in turn, we can
establish as our third feature Gehlen’s conception of man as
“Mängelwesen” (deficient being; Gehlen, 1993). Once again this
is based on a juxtaposition with the animal realm: while animals
possess relationships with their environment that are fixed and
genetically coded—as well as being subject to change through
progressive processes of adaptation’—the human being appears
to lack such a specific and codified environment. Thus, he is
“deficient” in a positive sense, for he can adapt his agency to every
possible context of life.
To sum up, the anthropological profile we have laid out
defines an idea of the human being as master of the earth, but
a master who is open and curious with regards to that which
lies outside the self, constitutively deficient and incapable of
permanently adapting to a single context of action.
Limit vs. Border (Kant)
This first trajectory invites us to shift our attention to a second
level of analysis and, in particular, to a crucial terminological
distinction, which constitutes my further conjecture. The
distinction in question is that which Kant drew up between limits
(Grenzen) and boundaries (Schranken) which, insofar as it is
connected to the possibility of “pure” or “speculative” reason, can
also be extended to the present question.
Right after the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant would also publish an additional work, the Prolegomena to
Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Present Itself as a
Science (1783), as a kind of accessible synthesis of the arguments
contained in the Critique. In paragraph 57 (“Conclusion—On
the determination of Limits of Pure Reason”) of this work one
encounters the following definition:
Limits [Grenzen] (in extended beings) always presuppose a
space existing outside a certain definite place, and inclosing
it; boundaries [Schranken] do not require this, but are mere
negations, which affect a quantity, so far as it is not absolutely
complete. But our reason, as it were, sees in its surroundings a
space for the cognition of things in themselves, though it can
never have definite notions of them, and is limited to phenomena
only (Kant, 1997, p. 122).
According to Kant, therefore, whilst the limit “always
presupposes a space,” which is located outside it and the
area which it encloses, the boundary simply negates this space
and encloses a given territory fromwithin without conceiving the
possibility that somethingmight exist beyond it. The limit defines
its own area of legitimacy and, at the same time, looks beyond
it in an attempt to understand what lies outside. Whilst aware
of the otherness of what lies beyond, the limit is nonetheless
always ready to go further and to engage in a discussion with the
other with a view to enlarging itself. The boundary, by contrast,
remains on the exact same territory, defining it more precisely
and more conclusively. In other terms, if the concept of the
limit—by its very nature—looks outward and beyond itself, that
of the boundary does not cease to focus its gaze on itself or,
rather, on its own interior, refusing to see anything other than
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that which it can master and, thus, demonstrating that either this
does not exist or is irrelevant to its own existence.
To put it in Kantian terms, we must try to effect a transition
from Schranke to Grenze, that is to turn the border into a limit,
replacing an inability to manage complexity and an inability to
innovate with a renewed energy for accomplishing both of these
tasks.
In Kant’s perspective, however, this distinction concerns only
the theoretical or epistemological domain: in other words, it
indicates the limit of so-called “scientific” knowledge, the type of
knowledge which is legitimated within the transcendental turn
developed by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
One of the most common usages of the term “border”—or
of its counterpart “limit”—is associated with the political sphere.
Here it is used to demarcate precise boundaries for the legitimacy
of a specific political order, or the validity of a certain system of
juridical norms which regulates coexistence among individuals.
In the field of political philosophy this is what we call the
“territorialization of politics.”
For some decades this concept has been fundamentally put
into question by the complex range of processes grouped under
the term “globalization.” And the development of this issue at
the global level is one of the most promising avenues for the
contemporary debate regarding such a term, that embraces the
entire sweep of the social sciences from philosophy to law, from
cultural studies to economics, sociology, history, and psychology.
Nonetheless, the human being’s drive to surpass his own limits
manifests itself at this level as well. Following the establishment of
a new, unstable balance of powers after the Second World War,
man’s effort to conquer “territory” beyond the Planet Earth has
been continually stimulated with the ever increasing investment
of economic resources. Only with the global crisis starting in 2007
did this investment arguably begin to plateau.
If the quest to conquer spaces beyond the borders of our
planet generates a need for a concomitant expansion of the
discourse surrounding borders and limits, then we should also
acknowledge the need for an expansion of the disciplinary
perspectives involved in our conceptualization of the subject.
By acknowledging this, perhaps we could also recognize that
we are on the verge of provoking a meltdown of traditional
disciplinary boundaries. Thus, we are currently awakening to
the possibility of a new and more comprehensive approach that
follows in Kant’s footsteps, by trying to convert borders into
limits and to transform disciplinary borders into possibilities of
effective dialogue among scientists from different disciplines who
are nevertheless equally committed to a topic that lies at the
frontier of human comprehension.
TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF
LIMITS—II: BIOETHICAL CHALLENGES
The awareness of this precarious location at the precipice of the
scientific unknown, in other words, a research problem whose
knowability depends on the acquisition of methods and tools
that the scientist does not yet possess, is made evident from the
completely different focus of any possible analysis in this field. In
other words, the task of converting borders into limits confronts
us simultaneously with the problem of a political frontier and
with the problem of having to navigate an intersection between
two separate biological—and, I would add, ontological—realms
that cannot be welded together.
Thus, we are approaching a frontier beyond which the
disciplinary lenses that have historically been used to tackle the
fundamental aspects of “human nature,” namely biology and
ontology, would have to be revolutionized if they are to remain
of any use.
Any further developments in a possible anthropology of limit
should start from this basic recognition: that we stand before a
border that perhaps cannot be converted into a limit.
The abundance of scientific evidence for this proposition is
nothing new. To return to our initial assumption, any future
anthropology of limit ought to sketch out the outlines of several
open questions or of some fundamental challenges that (1) do
not neglect the initial assumption; (2) seriously consider the need
for an enlargement and fusion of disciplinary approaches; (3) do
not underestimate the novel implications of the word “mastery”
when used to denote that which technological development has
rendered either real or possible.
In this context, we would like to draft at least two of a
potentially unfinished list of challenges regarding this area of
research: both belong to the context of bioethics.
Two Bioethical Challenges
The comprehensive bioethical challenge we would like to address
in this framework appears two-fold. We would like to convey its
general characteristics and to describe it by raising two different,
but ultimately related questions.
A Border or a Limit for Human Autonomy?
We started with the image of man as master of the Earth who,
to follow Bacon’s suggestion, seeks at all costs to enlarge and
deepen his sphere of mastery. If we consider expanding this
image further, we will be confronted by a new question. Man was
and remains the conqueror of the Earth thanks to his capacity
for “autonomy.” It is a conventional wisdom that the specific
factors that distinguishes man from other beings of comparable
biological complexity is precisely such a capacity.
In its most basic sense, the adjective “autonomous” refers
to the individual subject’s ability to become the starting point
(cause) of a series of physical effects. In a more comprehensive
sense, “to be autonomous” means to be capable of elaborating
and thus pursuing a certain conduct or a series of actions that
constitute a behavior.
Typically, however, we recognize that any attempt at
expressing individual autonomy “on Earth” has to come against
several “obstacles” and to rest upon a certain set of data and
conditions. But, at the same time, we can always predicate that
“it is up to me,” namely that it is a matter of individual choice
whether one does or does not perform a specific action or pursue
a specific goal.
As soon as we shift the entire range of questions about
choice, decision-making and autonomy that we have so crudely
simplified outside its “traditional” realm of discussion, namely
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that of life on Earth, we run up against a distinct need for
re-semantization.
It is a conventional wisdom that any human movement
outside the terrestrial atmosphere relies to a tremendous extent
on technology and on technological devices. We should, in fact,
admit that practically no decision concerning space exploration
could be taken without the support offered by technology.
We might even be forced to think that every such decision
is dependent on obstacles, data, and conditions that only
technological means can take into account and that can only
be elaborated and organized into an adequate line of conduct
through recourse to technology. In short, once we move beyond
Earth, we find ourselves in an environment that excludes the
possibility of human autonomy altogether.
Therefore, in very concise terms, we should raise the question
here as to whether the borders of the Earth correspond to the
boundaries within which the concept of “human autonomy” can
be sensibly applied. Is it possible in this case to turn this border
into a limit?
A complete anthropology of limit should develop all possible
expressions of these questions in order to explore new ways of
basing autonomy upon an area of agency that seems to exclude it
altogether—at least in terms of the categories through which we
conceptualize it.
We began with a discussion of man’s capacity for exercising a
sort of exclusive mastery over two different realms: “the earth,”
understood as territory external to the individual subject, and
“the self ” by focusing on the capability of organizing biological
stimuli and individual purposes into a line of autonomous
conduct.
By transgressing the earth’s borders, we can finally begin to
perceive that, from a situation of completemastery over the world
and over ourselves, we have passed into a state where technology
is the master of us and of our decisions.
Here we must face our first bio-ethical challenge. We must
recognize that turning borders into limits with regard to
autonomy, that is the biological distinction between human
beings and all other beings on Earth, might fail and, at any rate,
that it ought to take the need for a deep re-semantization of the
term “autonomy” into consideration.
To put things even more explicitly, we have arrived at a border
beyond which we can no longer uphold a central tenet of natural
and social sciences to date: namely the hitherto incontestable
truth that “man is an autonomous agent.”
At this point we can put forward a preliminary conclusion.
If we can no longer legitimately predicate the autonomy of the
human being, then we also lose the ability to affirm one of
the fundamental characteristics that distinguish such a being
from other Earthly creatures from a biological, neurological and
philosophical point of view.
Toward New Borders and Limits for Human
Physiology?
This last point helps us to approach the second bioethical
challenge at hand. In order to progress in our understanding of
such a limit, we have to make a step back and reconsider Charles
Darwin’s work of 1844, The Foundation of the Origins of Species.
This long essay anticipated Darwin’smagnum opus,On the Origin
of Species, which the author only decided to publish in 1859.
Toward the end of the essay, Darwin includes a rather strange
chapter, entitled “Abortive or Rudimentary Organs” (Darwin,
1909).
Darwin approaches the topic from both physiological and
naturalistic perspectives. He does not assign a specific meaning
to the words “abortive” and “rudimentary” or make any strong
distinction between them, instead imputing to them a general
connotation of underdevelopment.
Parts of structure are said to be “abortive” or, when in a still
lower state of development, “rudimentary.”3
In addition, he presents several example of such abortive or
rudimentary organs:
Thus, the rhinoceros, the whale, etc., have, when young, small
but properly formed teeth, which never protrude from the jaws;
certain bones, and even the entire extremities are represented
by mere little cylinders or points of bone, often soldered to
other bones: many beetles have exceedingly minute but regularly
formedwings lying under their wing-cases, which latter are united
never to be opened (Darwin, 1909, p. 231).
This is not the place for a more comprehensive examination
of such specific instances. For our purposes it is sufficient to
point out that most naturalists recognize—at least in the vast
majority of such cases—that these organs do not have any
evident use or function for the organisms in question: they are
“absolutely useless.” In Darwin’s view physiologists ascribed a
slightly different meaning to the word “abortive”:
Physiologists and medical men apply the term “abortive” in a
somewhat different sense from naturalists; and their application is
probably the primary one; namely, to parts, which from accident
or disease before birth are not developed or do not grow: thus,
when a young animal is born with a little stump in the place of a
finger or of the whole extremity, or with a little button instead of
a head, or with a mere bead of bony marker instead of a tooth, or
with a stump instead of a rail, these parts are said to be aborted
(Darwin, 1909, p. 234).
Physiologists thus considered there to be a specific cause in
the form of an extraordinary occurrence that could explain the
presence of abortive organs. Naturalists, by contrast, posited that
even in such extraordinary cases (e.g., of disease) the “abortive
results” would be hereditarily transmitted to the next generation.
Darwin, however, sought to rework both of these assumptions
so that they would be in conformity with his theory4. The most
important point for our discussion only emerges in the final
paragraph of this fascinating chapter:
There seems to be some probability that continued disuse of any
part or organ, and the selection of individuals with such parts
3Darwin (1909, p. 231). It should also be emphasized that Darwin fails to provide
such a distinction inOn the Origin of Species, even though the same topic is covered
in Chapter 14 (See Darwin, 1962, pp. 414–457, spec. pp. 450–457).
4“The strong hereditary tendency to reproduce every either congenital or slowly
acquired structure, whether useful or injurious to the individual, has been shown
in the first part <of the work>” (Darwin, 1909, p. 234).
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slightly less developed, would in the course of ages produce in
organic beings under domesticity races with such parts abortive.
We have every reason to believe that every part and organ in
an individual becomes fully developed only with exercise of its
functions; that it becomes developed in a somewhat lesser degree
with less exercise; and if forcibly precluded from all action, such
part will often become atrophied (Darwin, 1909, pp. 235–236).
As we know, Darwin was referring here exclusively to animals
and plants. Nonetheless, as we “transgress” the Earth’s borders,
perhaps we should consider whether the same processes might
not be extended to humankind.
Thus, the question arises: are we able to categorically exclude
the possibility of such a process in the case of humans should
“the conquest of the space” be taken further? At present this only
applies to astronauts, but by extension what would happen to
future generations of humans if in a futuristic scenario such trips
became more common and more accessible?
Humans are biologically and physiologically adapted to life on
Earth. By way of example, we could point out that humans are
“programmed” to make direct “contact” with the world outside
their bodies, to have tactile experiences starting from the first
moments of their lives, starting from their first encounter with
their mothers or with the subjects who nourish them. The tactile
experience, therefore, becomes one of themost basic and essential
perceptual mediums for man. We could go further and state that
the answer to the question “what is man?” partially depends on
the modality of his tactile contact with the external world and
the way this world becomes his or hers as a result of the repeated
nature of this experience.
If we accept this premise, then we have to ask an additional
ethical question: are we fully aware of and capable of accepting
the possibility that humans with abortive or rudimentary organs
may be born in the future?
Though in the example given we focused on touch, we could
use the same analogy to deal with other human capacities: sight,
eating, and digesting food, walking, or to speak in terms of
“organs,” the eyes, the stomach, legs or more generally, the entire
muscular system.
Here the attempt to convert a biological border into a bio-
physiological limit—that opens the door to an atrophying of our
organs and of parts of our body, but perhaps also to an atrophying
of certain parts of the human brain—should be carefully taken
into consideration.
It is by addressing this question and attempting to articulate
this second bio-ethical challenge that an anthropology of limit
establishes its role and its claim to disciplinary legitimacy.
To conclude, we can affirm that the anxiety for perfection
from which we started, if linked to the dialectics between limits
and borders from which an anthropology of limit originates, and
if applied to an extra-terrestrial context, gives rise to a host of
unexplored issues and fundamental challenges that are far from
being fully known and far from being solved. Possible solutions,
or, at least, superior conceptualizations of these challenges can
be arrived at only if we agree to open up the frontiers of
our disciplines, to convert our borders into limits and, in so
doing, to inaugurate a new wave of interdisciplinary and global
responsibility toward humankind. Through a re-semantization
of key concepts, it is this duty that we must prioritize above
everything else.
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